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Title
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Some concerns with experientialism about depiction: the case of separation seeing in
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Author
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Abstract
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| Experiential theories claim that depictive representations should be defined with reference to the experience elicited in their viewers. To accommodate both the visual and the representational character of pictures, they introduce the idea of a standard of correctness determining the appropriate pictorial subject, which is made available to our experience by resorting to general background knowledge. I argue that this kind of account is unable to clarify what makes some piece of information more suitable than another to contribute to the recognition of the depicted subject. I support my point with an analysis of the notion of separation seeing-in, developed by Robert Hopkins to account for pictures like stick-figure drawings, which exhibit a gap between what is visible in them and what we take them to depict. The result is that visual experience cannot guide the selection of the necessary information to individuate the represented subject: the representational function of a picture cannot be reduced to any idea of experience suitably constrained. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Proceedings of the European Society for Aesthetics
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Publication
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2018
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ISSN
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1664-5278
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Volume/pages
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10
(2018)
, p. 19-34
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Full text (open access)
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