|
Title
|
|
|
|
CCP game : a game theoretical model for improving the scheduling of chemical cluster patrolling
|
|
|
Author
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Abstract
|
|
|
|
| Chemical clusters can be attractive targets for terrorism, due to the extreme importance of them as well as due to the existence of dangerous materials. Patrolling is scheduled for better securing chemical clusters. However, the current patrolling strategies fail on competing with intelligent attackers and therefore can be non-optimal. The so-called chemical cluster patrolling (CCP) game is proposed in this paper. The CCP game employs game theory as a methodology, aiming at randomly but strategically scheduling security patrols in chemical clusters. The patroller and the attacker are modelled as the two rational players in the CCP game. The patroller's strategy is defined as probabilistically traveling within the cluster or patrolling some plants while the attacker's strategy is formulated as a combination of an attack target, the start time of the attack, and the attack scenario to be used. The Stackelberg equilibrium and a robust solution which takes into consideration of the patroller's distribution-free uncertainties on the attacker's parameters are defined for predicting the outcome of the CCP game. Results of the case study indicate that the patrolling strategy suggested by the CCP game outperforms both the fixed patrolling route strategy and the purely randomized patrolling strategy. |
|
|
|
Language
|
|
|
|
English
|
|
|
Source (journal)
|
|
|
|
Reliability engineering and system safety. - Barking
|
|
|
Publication
|
|
|
|
Barking
:
2019
|
|
|
ISSN
|
|
|
|
0951-8320
|
|
|
DOI
|
|
|
|
10.1016/J.RESS.2018.06.014
|
|
|
Volume/pages
|
|
|
|
191
(2019)
, p. 1-12
|
|
|
ISI
|
|
|
|
000491685000062
|
|
|
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Full text (open access)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
|
|
|
|
|
|