|
Title
|
|
|
|
Are higher mechanistic levels causally autonomous?
|
|
|
Author
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Abstract
|
|
|
|
| This article provides a detailed analysis and explores the prospects of the arguments for higher-level causal autonomy available for the proponents of the mechanistic framework. Three different arguments (context based, organization based, and constraint based) are distinguished. After clarifying previously raised worries with regard to the first two arguments, the article focuses on the newest version of the third argument that has recently been revived by William Bechtel. By using Bechtel's own case study, it is shown that not even reference to constraints can establish the causal autonomy of higher mechanistic levels. |
|
|
|
Language
|
|
|
|
English
|
|
|
Source (journal)
|
|
|
|
Philosophy of science : journal of the Philosophy of Science Association. - East Lansing, Mich., 1934, currens
|
|
|
Publication
|
|
|
|
East Lansing, Mich.
:
2019
|
|
|
ISSN
|
|
|
|
0031-8248
1539-767X
[e-ISSN]
|
|
|
DOI
|
|
|
|
10.1086/705450
|
|
|
Volume/pages
|
|
|
|
86
:5
(2019)
, p. 847-857
|
|
|
ISI
|
|
|
|
000502315900004
|
|
|
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Full text (open access)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
|
|
|
|
|
|