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Title
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Diachronic causal constitutive relations
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Author
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Abstract
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| Mechanistic approaches are very common in the causal interpretation of biological and neuroscientific experimental work in today's philosophy of science. In the mechanistic literature a strict distinction is often made between (intralevel) causal relations and (interlevel) constitutive relations, where the latter cannot be causal. One of the typical reasons for this strict distinction is that constitutive relations are supposedly synchronic whereas most if not all causal relations are diachronic. This strict distinction gives rise to a number of problems, however. Our end goal in this paper is to argue that it should be given up, at least in the context of the biological and the psychological sciences. To that effect, we argue that constitutive relations in this context are diachronic, thus undermining the aforementioned reason. We offer two cases from scientific practice in which constitutive relations are regarded as both diachronic and causally efficacious, review three existing ways of dealing with the apparent diachronic nature of interlevel relations in mechanisms and propose a new account of diachronic, causal constitutive relevance. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Synthese : an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science. - Dordrecht, 1936, currens
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Publication
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Dordrecht
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Springer
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2020
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ISSN
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0039-7857
[print]
1573-0964
[online]
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DOI
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10.1007/S11229-020-02616-0
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Volume/pages
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p. 1-31
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ISI
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000563913700002
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (open access)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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