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Title
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Bodily self-determination and the limits of being one-self
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Author
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Abstract
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| The chapter reflects on the debate about bodily self-determination. Since a person is a basic particular (Strawson) constituted by psychical, physical and social-ethical dimensions, a person cannot be reduced to any of these dimensions. A further reflection on the nature of embodiment, inspired by Husserl, sustains some ethical reflections on the possibilities and limits of bodily self-determination. Since embodiment is co-constitutive of the self, bodily self-determination is not a right but a true juridical principle, from which basic rights concerning bodilyness need to be deduced. Furthermore and more importantly, I argue that bodily self-determination entails a right to dispose of one’s own body as an object. Although the body is co-constitutive of personhood, the non-identity of a person with her body, opens up the possibility of an objectification. Judicial and legal issuing of rules in the context of therapeutic interventions, donorship and organ transplant confirm this. Because of the complex relation between a person and her body, several moral attitudes vis-à-vis the body are necessary: (a) concerning the body as a co-constitutive element of a living person, (b) concerning the living, but depersonalised body (cerebral death), (c) concerning the mortal remains of a person, (d) concerning the objectified personal body. |
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Language
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English
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Source (book)
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The Person at the Crossroads. A Philosophical Approach/Beauregard, J. [edit.]; et al. [edit.]
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Source (series)
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Vernon Series in Philosophy
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Publication
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Delaware United States
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Vernon Press
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2020
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ISBN
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978-1-62273-888-5
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Volume/pages
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p. 253-266
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