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Title
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Perceiving indeterminately
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Author
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Abstract
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| It has been argued recently that perception is indeterminate. But there are more than one ways of spelling out what this means. The standard line is that perceptual states attribute different probabilities to different propositions. I provide an alternative to this view, where it is not the attitude, but the content of perceptual states that is indeterminate, inasmuch as it consists of the representation of determinable properties. This view does justice to the more general claim that perception is indeterminate without appealing to probability either in the attitude or in the content. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Thought : a journal of philosophy / Northern Institute of Philosophy; Thought Trust. - Hoboken, N.J., 2012, currens
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Publication
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Hoboken
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Wiley
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2020
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ISSN
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2161-2234
[online]
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DOI
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10.1002/THT3.454
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Volume/pages
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9
:3
(2020)
, p. 160-166
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ISI
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000530576100001
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (open access)
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