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Title
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The paradox of interactive fiction : a new approach to imaginative participation in light of interactive fiction experiences
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Author
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Abstract
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| How can we be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina? With this question, Colin Radford introduced the paradox of fiction, or the problem that we can feel emotions towards characters and events which we know do not really exist. Ever since, philosophers have tried to solve this paradox by investigating how fiction might motivate us to feel emotions towards fictional objects without ever motivating us to interact with them: we do not try to save Anna Karenina, nor do we try to run away from monsters in horror movies, even if they scare us. In the past decennia, however, the medium of interactive fiction has shown this way of handling the paradox of fiction to be outdated. Videogames show us that we can not only be made to feel emotions towards fictional characters or events, but that we can also be motivated to undertake actions towards them, even when we fully know they are not real. As such, videogames introduce a paradox of interactive fiction: a paradox of fictional emotions and actions. In light of interactive fictional works such as videogames, and in a parallel to Radford’s original question, we might now ask: how can we be moved to shoot fictional zombies, when we know they are not real? In this thesis, I explore the interactive and self-involving imaginative experiences that are offered by videogames. Central to this investigation is the problem presented by the paradox of interactive fiction, which consists of three claims that cannot be true at the same time, as a contradiction would follow: 1) it is impossible to act on fictional objects, 2) videogame objects (such as zombies) are fictional, and 3) players act on videogame objects (for example by shooting zombies). I propose a solution to this paradox by describing how players, and their actions, become fictional themselves when they interact with the worlds presented in videogames. Players can only fictionally shoot zombies. Based on my description of players’ fictional experience of videogames, I re-examine and modify the way philosophers of fiction have conceptualized imaginative participation, fictional actions, and desire-like imaginings. |
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Language
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English
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Publication
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Antwerp
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University of Antwerp, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy
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2020
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Volume/pages
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201 p.
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Note
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:
Cools, Arthur [Supervisor]
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Myin, Erik [Supervisor]
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Full text (open access)
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