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Title
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Diversity disqualifies global uniform carbon pricing for effective climate policy
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Author
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Abstract
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| Real economies and societies are diverse. Applied economics responds to diversity by a variety in technologies, institutions, products, policies, for meeting the demands of differentiated actors. Nevertheless, neoclassical economics states that climate change can be regulated most efficiently by installing a global uniform carbon price. This position is based on many assumptions, such as full substitutability, negligible transaction costs, and boundless scale economies. However, diversity is relevant for designing well functioning carbon pricing policies. Diversity is a gradual property for cataloging homogeneous and heterogeneous cases. When categories are incompatible, substitutability is problematic, and transaction costs are high, respecting diversity is beneficial, not costly. Negating heterogeneity (strong diversity) by applying uniform approaches triggers subsequent remedial ad-hoc policies to anyhow address relevant differences. Ex-ante consideration of diversity prevents the flaws of remedial policies. By opting for diverse, case specific financial incentives, economics would well partner with other social sciences in search for realistic, effective, efficient and just climate policies. The global uniform carbon price is a theoretical concept, unlikely to ever be realized, hence escaping decisive assessment of its actual performance. We suggest a substitute indicator for UNFCCC monitoring of countries' efforts to financially incentivize climate actions. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Environmental science & policy. - Oxford
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Publication
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Oxford
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2020
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ISSN
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1462-9011
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DOI
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10.1016/J.ENVSCI.2020.04.014
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Volume/pages
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112
(2020)
, p. 282-292
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ISI
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000571832000012
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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