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Title
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Mental action, control and responsibility : how I couldn’t have thought differently, but I will in the future
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Author
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Abstract
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| This dissertation attempts to accomplish three things: it develops a control-based account of mental action, a novel argument against free will, and an account of responsibility which is designed to suit both mental and bodily actions. After introducing the central ideas of action theory in chapter 1, the second chapter makes the notion of cognitive control explicit. Five control functions which have been shown to be experimentally separable are discussed. Although these functions specify dimensions along which mental processes can be controlled, the measures which were used to individuate them are too coarse-grained to specify how the processes that fall within the scope of each individual function are themselves controlled. This is illustrated by analyzing the phenomenology of some experiments that were used to individuate the functions. Chapter 3 first develops the concept of attentional episode, which is used in combination with the functions identified in chapter 2 to define mental actions. A taxonomy of mental actions is then provided, and the account is illustrated with examples. Chapter 4 develops a new argument against free will, understood as the principle of alternate possibilities, as applied to mental actions, which is termed the possibility of alternative thought (PAT). It argues that it is impossible for a subject to think differently in a given situation. After introducing the PAT, a taxonomy of content types is offered, based on control structure. The scenarios of content generation are then analyzed for each type of content; it is shown that none can satisfy the PAT. The fifth chapter discusses three well-known conceptions of moral responsibility – the desert-based, the consequentialist and the reactive attitudes approach. An overarching notion of responsibility is then introduced, which can be applied across domains (moral, epistemic, etc.). Chapter 6 develops a hybrid account of responsibility for other-directed cases: it adopts the consequentialist idea that the goal of holding someone responsible is to bring about desired consequences. Still, it doesn’t justify the act of holding responsible by the fact that this will produce desired consequences. Rather, it follows Strawson’s idea that being responsible reduces to the practice of holding responsible. Other than Strawson’s approach, this account takes the objective attitude as starting point, from which an initial responsibility measure is developed, which is then modified by adopting a reactive attitude. This process takes four steps, each of which comports a separate section. The last chapter modifies the account to accommodate self-directed cases |
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Language
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English
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Publication
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Antwerp
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University of Antwerp,Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy
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2020
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Volume/pages
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180 p.
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Note
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:
Nanay, Bence [Supervisor]
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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