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Title
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Wittgenstein's challenge to enactivism
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Author
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Abstract
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| Many authors have identified a link between later Wittgenstein and enactivism. But few have also recognised how Wittgenstein may in fact challenge enactivist approaches. In this paper, I consider one such challenge. For example, Wittgenstein is well known for his discussion of seeing-as, most famously through his use of Jastrow's ambiguous duck-rabbit picture. Seen one way, the picture looks like a duck. Seen another way, the picture looks like a rabbit. Drawing on some of Wittgenstein's remarks about seeing-as, I show how Wittgenstein poses a challenge for proponents of Sensorimotor Enactivism, like O'Regan and Noe, namely to provide a sensorimotor framework within which seeing-as can be explained. I claim that if these proponents want to address this challenge, then they should endorse what I call Sensorimotor Identification, according to which visual experiences can be identified with what agents do. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Synthese : an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science. - Dordrecht, 1936, currens
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Publication
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Dordrecht
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2021
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ISSN
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0039-7857
[print]
1573-0964
[online]
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DOI
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10.1007/S11229-019-02244-3
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Volume/pages
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198
:SUPPL 1s:[1]
(2021)
, p. 391-404
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ISI
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000616764100019
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (open access)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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