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Title
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The Central Bank governor and interest rate setting by committee
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Author
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Abstract
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| This article studies the role of central bank governors in monetary policy decisions taken by a committee. To carry out this analysis, we constructed a novel dataset of committee voting behaviour for six OECD countries for up to three decades. Using a range of Taylor rule specifications, we show that a change in governor significantly affects interest rate setting. We also observe systematic differences in interest rate rules based on the political party appointing the governor, with more inflation-averse policies under governors that are appointed by a right-wing political authority. We show the robustness of this result by using a wider dataset (including over 3000 observations from 12 countries). (JEL codes: E02, E5, P16) |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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CESifo economic studies / CESifo; IFO-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung [Münich] - Oxford, 2003, currens
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Publication
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Oxford
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Oxford university press
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2021
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ISSN
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1610-241X
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DOI
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10.1093/CESIFO/IFAA013
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Volume/pages
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67
:2
(2021)
, p. 155-185
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Article Reference
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ifaa013
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ISI
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000670806900002
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Medium
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E-only publicatie
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (open access)
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