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Title
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Joint bidding and horizontal subcontracting
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Author
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Abstract
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| This paper investigates joint bidding when firms have incentives to sign subcontracts with each other after competing in the bidding stage. A bidding consortium affects the horizontal subcontracting market and, through backward induction, alters firms’ bids. Our findings challenge the current legal practice that consortia without efficiencies must pass the “no-solo-bidding test”, requiring that its members could not bid stand-alone. Our framework predicts that the formation of a temporary consortium, which has the feature that it dissolves after submitting a losing bid, benefits the procurer. The winning bid is more competitive with a temporary as compared to a structural consortium. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam, 1983, currens
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Publication
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Amsterdam
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North Holland
,
2021
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ISSN
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0167-7187
[print]
1873-7986
[online]
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DOI
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10.1016/J.IJINDORG.2021.102727
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Volume/pages
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76
(2021)
, p. 1-19
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Article Reference
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102727
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ISI
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000655319000009
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Medium
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E-only publicatie
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (open access)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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