Title
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Cooperation and conflict in the European defence-industrial field : the role of relative gains
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Author
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Abstract
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Defence-industrial collaborative activities have gained a central stage in the current European debate, based on the simultaneous presence of two systemic pressures (unipolarity and “defence-industrial globalization”) that are pushing EU member states towards more cooperation in these issues. Nevertheless, the European defence-industrial panorama still continues to be characterized by both cooperation and conflict. Protectionism, oligopolistic market straining and primary resource to domestic suppliers have prevented a more structured defence-industrial cooperation. The aim of this article is to add empirical evidence to recent academic works that highlighted how relative gains play a key role in understanding the simultaneous presence of cooperation and conflict in the European security architecture. In doing so, this analysis focuses on the European defence-industrial landscape and specifically on British, French and Italian preferences towards armaments cooperation. To preview the conclusions, France, Italy and the UK have constantly pursued greater intra-European cooperation, in order to increase their power within the international defence-industrial market. However, they have refused to participate in European defence-industrial initiatives when other countries would have a greater advantage from this cooperation. This happened despite strong geopolitical and strategic incentives to cooperate. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Defence Studies. - [Plaats van uitgave niet gekend]
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Publication
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[Plaats van uitgave niet gekend]
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2018
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ISSN
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1470-2436
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DOI
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10.1080/14702436.2018.1487766
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Volume/pages
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18
:4
(2018)
, p. 474-497
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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