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Title
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Some inaccuracies about accuracy conditions
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Author
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Abstract
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| The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to show that within contemporary philosophy of perception, it has become far from clear what proponents of the Content View mean when they claim that experience has accuracy conditions and, therefore, accuracy evaluable content. Two very different interpretations can be discerned here, one which holds that content has accuracy conditions and one which explicitly identifies content with such conditions. On the other hand, the paper wants to argue that neither of these versions succeeds in showing why we should attribute either accuracy conditions or accuracy evaluable content to perceptual experience. To this end, I will present an elaborated argument (which focuses on the moon illusion) to show why we have as yet no reason to think that perceptual experience has accuracy conditions and, therefore, accuracy evaluable content. Instead, it will be argued that perceptual experience is best thought of as accuracy maker, not as something which can itself be representationally accurate or inaccurate. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. - Dordrecht, 2002, currens
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Publication
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Dordrecht
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2023
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ISSN
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1568-7759
[print]
1572-8676
[online]
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DOI
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10.1007/S11097-021-09771-W
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Volume/pages
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22
:2
(2023)
, p. 461-477
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ISI
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000695389500002
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (open access)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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