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Title
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A common sense response to Hume’s moral atheism : Reid on morality and theism
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Author
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Abstract
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| In this chapter I present Reid’s answers to non-theist implications of Hume’s moral philosophy. One non-theist implication of Hume’s view is the claim that morality is tied to human nature, and is hence secular because it is autonomous from religious doctrines, beliefs or motivations. Another implication is that the standard of morality is determined by human mental states and psychological processes, and hence renders all reference to an objective, mind-independent, standard, unnecessary. A final implication, according to Hume, is that our human passions are not directed toward God, and hence that God is not the object of any human moral discourse. In response, Reid agrees with Hume that morality is tied to human nature and autonomous from religion, but he argues that the truth of moral principles is not relative to human nature and to natural human passions. It follows, Reid holds, that talk of a benevolent God is intelligible. I argue that Reid’s explicit objective is not only to criticize Hume’s moral philosophy, but also his moral atheism. |
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Language
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English
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Source (book)
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Common sense in the Scottish Enlightenment / Bow, C.B. [edit.]
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Publication
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Oxford
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Oxford University Press
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2018
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ISBN
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978-0-19-878390-9
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DOI
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10.1093/OSO/9780198783909.003.0006
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Volume/pages
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p. 107-124
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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