|
Title
|
|
|
|
A dynamic multi-objective duopoly game with capital accumulation and pollution
| |
|
Author
|
|
|
|
| |
|
Abstract
|
|
|
|
| This paper studies a discrete-time dynamic duopoly game with homogenous goods. Both firms have to decide on investment where investment increases production capacity so that they are able to put a larger quantity on the market. The downside, however, is that a larger quantity raises pollution. The firms have multiple objectives in the sense that each one maximizes the discounted profit stream and appreciates a clean environment as well. We obtain some surprising results. First, where it is known from the continuous-time differential game literature that firms invest more under a feedback information structure compared to an open-loop one, we detect scenarios where the opposite holds. Second, in a feedback Nash equilibrium, capital stock is more sensitive to environmental appreciation than in the open-loop case. |
| |
|
Language
|
|
|
|
English
| |
|
Source (journal)
|
|
|
|
Mathematics
| |
|
Publication
|
|
|
|
2021
| |
|
ISSN
|
|
|
|
2227-7390
| |
|
DOI
|
|
|
|
10.3390/MATH9161983
| |
|
Volume/pages
|
|
|
|
9
:16
(2021)
, p. 1-34
| |
|
Article Reference
|
|
|
|
1983
| |
|
ISI
|
|
|
|
000689402100001
| |
|
Medium
|
|
|
|
E-only publicatie
| |
|
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
|
|
|
|
| |
|
Full text (open access)
|
|
|
|
| |
|