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Title
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International tax law between loyalty, exit, and voice
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Author
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Abstract
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| Discourse on the merits and pitfalls of multilateral cooperation for advancing justice in international tax law have recently re-emerged in the literature. Some tax scholars, even while criticizing global projects like the OECD/G20 initiatives on base erosion, profit shifting and the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy, insist that cooperative efforts herald a step in the right direction. Others contest the feasibility of international cooperation or its value for developing countries. Drawing on Albert Hirschman’s oft-cited framework for actor behaviour under institutional malperformance, this article shows that there are three alternatives for those discontented with the status quo: to remain loyal despite disagreeing (cooperation); exit and perhaps form a competing regime (competition); or try to change the existing rules by speaking up (un-cooperation). The article concludes that the interaction of these options (contested cooperation) is an integral part of today’s transnational tax law order. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Dalhousie law journal / Dalhousie University. Faculty of Law. - Halifax
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Publication
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Halifax
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2021
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ISSN
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0317-1663
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Volume/pages
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44
:1
(2021)
, p. 49-69
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Full text (open access)
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