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Title
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Clarifying moral clarification : on Taylor’s contribution to metaethics
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Author
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Abstract
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| Given Taylor’s status as one of the most important thinkers in contemporary moral and political philosophy, it is somewhat surprising that so little attention has been paid to the implications of his views for metaethics. To fill this gap, this paper considers the highly unorthodox approach to metaethics articulated in his philosophy. While his views can be seen as “anti-metaethical,” I argue that Taylor in fact takes the cause of metaethics in a new direction by showing the problems of moral realism in a whole new light. To demonstrate this, I first sketch the mainstream debate on moral realism (§1) to clear the way for Taylor’s non-mainstream approach (§2). I continue to explain his unusual position by highlighting the contrast between the classical conception of moral facts and Taylor’s key concepts of “strong evaluation” and “moral sources” (§3). Against the background of this contrast, I turn to Taylor’s view on the nature of language to explain how it informs his distinctive conception of moral realism (§4). I conclude by discussing the implications of Taylor’s realism for wider trends within metaethics (§5). |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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International journal of philosophical studies. - Landsberg, 1993, currens
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Publication
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Landsberg
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2021
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ISSN
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0967-2559
[print]
1466-4542
[online]
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DOI
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10.1080/09672559.2021.1992474
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Volume/pages
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29
:5
(2021)
, p. 705-722
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ISI
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000715129400001
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (open access)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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