|
Title
|
|
|
|
Better scared than sorry : the pragmatic account of emotional representation
|
|
|
Author
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Abstract
|
|
|
|
| Some emotional representations seem to be unreliable. For instance, we are often afraid when there is no danger present. If emotions such as fear are so unreliable, what function do they have in our representational system? This is a problem for representationalist theories of emotion. I will argue that seemingly unreliable emotional representations are reliable after all. While many mental states strike an optimal balance between minimizing inaccurate representations and maximizing accurate representations, some emotional representations only aim at maximizing accuracy. They detect important phenomena such as danger based on little evidence, which will lead to a lot of false alarms. When it matters, however, these emotional representations will detect danger and other important phenomena. Often, one is better scared (and wrong) than sorry. |
|
|
|
Language
|
|
|
|
English
|
|
|
Source (journal)
|
|
|
|
Erkenntnis: an international journal of analytical philosophy. - Dordrecht
|
|
|
Publication
|
|
|
|
Dordrecht
:
Springer
,
2023
|
|
|
ISSN
|
|
|
|
0165-0106
[print]
1572-8420
[online]
|
|
|
DOI
|
|
|
|
10.1007/S10670-021-00470-1
|
|
|
Volume/pages
|
|
|
|
88
:6
(2023)
, p. 2633-2650
|
|
|
ISI
|
|
|
|
000705687100001
|
|
|
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Full text (open access)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
|
|
|
|
|
|