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Title
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Moral perception as imaginative apprehension
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Author
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Abstract
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| Moral perception is typically understood as moral properties perception, i.e., the perceptual registration of moral properties such as wrongness or dignity. In this article, I defend a view of moral perception as a process that involves imaginative apprehension of reality. It is meant as an adjustment to the dominant view of moral perception as moral properties perception and as an addition to existing Murdochian approaches to moral perception. The view I present here builds on Iris Murdoch’s moral psychology and holds that moral perception is an imaginative exploration of the particularity of concrete objects of moral reality (e.g., persons, situations, and events), rather than a registration of moral properties. I argue that such imaginative apprehension includes direct and reflective uses of imagination and that this process grounds experiential moral knowledge that serves the ultimate role of moral perception: getting a better grip on concrete objects of moral reality. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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The journal of ethics. - Dordrecht, 1997, currens
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Publication
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Dordrecht
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Kluwer Academic Publishers
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2023
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ISSN
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1382-4554
[print]
1572-8609
[online]
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DOI
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10.1007/S10892-023-09462-5
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Volume/pages
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(2023)
, 20 p.
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ISI
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001087603500001
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (open access)
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The author-created version that incorporates referee comments and is the accepted for publication version Available from 21.10.2024
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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