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Title
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Emotions in time : the temporal unity of emotion phenomenology
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Author
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Abstract
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| According to componential theories of emotional experience, emotional experiences are phenomenally complex in that they consist of experiential parts, which may include cognitive appraisals, bodily feelings, and action tendencies. These componential theories face the problem of emotional unity: Despite their complexity, emotional experiences also seem to be phenomenologically unified. Componential theories have to give an account of this unity. We argue that existing accounts of emotional unity fail and that instead emotional unity is an instance of experienced causal-temporal unity. We propose that felt emotional unity arises from our experience of the temporal-causal order of the world. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Mind and language. - Oxford
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Publication
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Hoboken
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Wiley
,
2024
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ISSN
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0268-1064
[print]
1468-0017
[online]
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DOI
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10.1111/MILA.12489
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Volume/pages
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39
:3
(2024)
, p. 348-363
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ISI
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001087633000001
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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