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Title
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The philosophy of temperature perception
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Author
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Abstract
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| This thesis in philosophy argues for a representational theory of temperature perception. The general claim of the thesis is that humans have a sense modality for perceiving temperatures of external object, body surface temperature, and core body temperature, and that this sense modality is a representational system. Supporting arguments are made that: (1) Sense modalities can be individuated by a neuroethological theory, (2) Temperature perception counts as a sense modality on a modified neuroethological theory, which is presented in this thesis. (3) Perception of temperature is best understood as representing temperatures, not the exchange of thermal energy with the environment. (4) A teleosemantic informational theory of representation can explain the ability to represent temperatures. (5) The teleosemantic informational theory of representation can be supplemented with a notion of structural representation, which explains further representational abilities of perceptual systems. (6) The representational theory of temperature perception explains both normal temperature sensation and some temperature illusions. (7) Painful temperature experience can be explained in a representational theory as well: thermal pain represents a threat to thermal homeostasis. In the last chapter, an argument is made that the concept of vividness, as applied in philosophy and psychology, can only be applied to temperature perception under a certain interpretation of that concept. |
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Language
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English
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Publication
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Antwerpen
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Universiteit Antwerpen, Faculteit Letteren en Wijsbegeerte, Departement Wijsbegeerte
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2023
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Volume/pages
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171 p.
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Note
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Nanay, Bence [Supervisor]
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Full text (open access)
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