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Title
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What is the attitude of desire?
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Author
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Abstract
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| I defend a view of the attitude of desire against a close rival. Both views are versions of "the guise of the good" thesis. The guise of the good says that a desire for P involves P appearing good in some respect. I defend a content-based account of value appearances against an attitude-based account. On the content view, a desire for P represents P as good while the attitude of that desire presents P's value as true. In other words, a desire for P presents it as true that P is good.1 The attitude view says that a desire represents P non-evaluatively while the attitude of that desire presents P as good. In other words, a desire for P presents P as good. The attitude view struggles to explain the relationship between the qualitative character of desires and appearances of value. It must either implausibly deny that there is a close relationship between the two, or explain the relationship by introducing a poorly motivated, revisionist mental ontology. In the present state of the debate between the two views, this problem tips the scales in favor of the content view. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Philosophical psychology. - Abington
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Publication
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Abingdon
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Routledge journals, taylor & francis ltd
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2024
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ISSN
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0951-5089
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DOI
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10.1080/09515089.2023.2296589
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Volume/pages
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(2024)
, p. 1-25
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ISI
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001135401300001
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (open access)
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The author-created version that incorporates referee comments and is the accepted for publication version Available from 02.01.2025
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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