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Title
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Public charades, or how the enactivist can tell apart pretense from non-pretense
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Author
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Abstract
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| Enactive approaches to cognition argue that cognition, including pretense, comes about through the dynamical interaction of agent and environment. Applied to cognition, these approaches cast cognition as an activity an agent performs interacting in specifc ways with her environment. This view is now under signifcant pressure: in a series of recent publications, Peter Langland-Hassan has proposed a number of arguments which purportedly should lead us to conclude that enactive approaches are unable to account for pretense without paying a way too severe theoretical price. In this paper, we will defend enactive approaches to pretense, arguing that they can in fact explain pretense without incurring in the negative theoretical consequences Peter Langland-Hassan fears. To this efect, we start by exposing Langland-Hassan’s challenge (§2), to then highlight its core assumptions and demonstrate their falsity(§3). Having done so, we argue that none of the theoretical consequences Langland-Hassan fears follow (§4), and in fact enactive approaches to cognition may be explanatorily superior to the one Langland-Hassan favors (§5). A brief conclusion will then follow (§6). |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Erkenntnis: an international journal of analytical philosophy. - Dordrecht
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Publication
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Dordrecht
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2024
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ISSN
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0165-0106
[print]
1572-8420
[online]
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DOI
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10.1007/S10670-024-00787-7
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Volume/pages
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(2024)
, 23 p.
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ISI
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001190173000001
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (open access)
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The author-created version that incorporates referee comments and is the accepted for publication version Available from 23.03.2025
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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