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Title
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The Belgian Constitutional Court: navigating between constitutional rights and consociational politics
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Author
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Abstract
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| This contribution measures the strength of the judgments by the Belgian Constitutional Court and looks for explanations. It revelas that the Court is a strategic actor. Its judgments are more stringent if the federal government is either a minority or an oversized government. By contrast, in periods of political instability, it prefers to refer cases to the full bench, which gives more leeway to the law-maker. The same applies to salient cases. This means that the Court deals with threats of instability in different ways. It holds the reins more tightly when instability lies within the coalition itself, but gives the coalition more room for concerted remedies when the threat to stability is external in nature. In addition, the political preference of the majority on the bench of the court plays a role. However, as judges are appointed by political parties on the basis of proportionality, and benches are composed in a different way for each case, this factor is outweighed overall. Finally, the personality of the President matters. The study shows that strong Presidents can leave their mark as to how the Court will address Parliament. |
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Language
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English
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Source (book)
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Constitutional Review in Western Europe. Judicial-legislative relations in comparative perspective / Pócza, K. [edit.]
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Publication
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New York
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Routledge
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2024
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ISBN
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978-1-032-50662-3
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Volume/pages
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p. 52-76
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