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Title
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Constitutional strategies in the face of multi-level governance : an empirical legal theory of EU integration
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Author
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Abstract
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| Nowadays in the territory of the European Union power is spread across different overlapping levels. This institutional setting has been defined as ‘multi-level governance’ and it is currently one of the most hotly debated concept in political science. At the national level, constitutional actors (national and subnational parliaments and executives; ordinary and apex courts) are called, each within the mandate assigned to it by national constitutions, to secure the jurisdictional integrity of both national and European law within national boundaries, while at the same time providing legitimacy to EU claims of authority. Building on existing studies, the thesis considers two main constitutional strategies: an ‘efficiency strategy’ focusing on the efficient implementation of EU law, and a ‘legitimacy strategy’ characterized by the need to legitimize the ‘intrusion’ of EU law into the national legal order. In practice, these translate inter alia in foreseeing or not procedural or substantive obstacles (such as super-majorities or referendum) for the ratification of EU treaties, or accepting or contesting the primacy of EU law over national law. By looking at the national constitutional design, the study measures whether they are more “open by design”, or in turn whether they value more the “integrity” vis-à-vis external potential threats. After placing each constitutional system on this spectrum, the study tackles the questions a) What contextual factors explain the orientation of the constitutional design towards “openness” or “integrity”? b) What factors explain the evolution over time of the national constitutional design? To answer such questions, the study employs an interdisciplinary research approach combining doctrinal legal research (carried out on the basis of country reports drafted by national experts in 12 EU Member States), Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and basic game theoretic models. Following a conjunctural-causation logic, the research shows that different combinations of social, historical, political and economic contextual factors are sufficient to explain the constitutional design in different cases. Finally, it demonstrates that, through their (sometimes seeming antagonistic) interactions with supranational actors, national constitutional actors aim to strike a balance between both the efficient and legitimate implementation of EU law, highlighting the need to preserve an heterarchical constitutional structure. |
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Language
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English
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Publication
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Antwerp
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University of Antwerp, Faculty of Law
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2024
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DOI
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10.63028/10067/2057660151162165141
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Volume/pages
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290 p.
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Note
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Popelier, Patricia [Supervisor]
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Bursens, Peter [Supervisor]
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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