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Title
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Exploring the revolving door phenomenon among European interest groups : triggers, conditions, and potential benefits
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Author
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Abstract
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| The European Union (EU) integration process has historically emphasized detailed regulations within specialized policy areas. Interest groups play a pivotal role in this policymaking process by providing EU legislators with "access goods," which include technical expertise, information on European interests at stake, and insights into the configuration of interests at the national level. These non-state actors are crucial in voicing civil society's interests and shaping policies. However, interest groups face power struggles and complex dynamics when representing their interests, one of which involves the "revolving door" phenomenon. This occurs when interest groups strategically hire individuals from the public sector to exploit personal connections or insider knowledge of governmental institutions, potentially influencing legislation. The revolving door phenomenon has been extensively studied in the U.S., where lobbyists' personal characteristics are linked to this practice. However, there is limited research on whether and why interest groups in the EU engage in revolving door practices. This gap in the literature highlights a need to explore how EU interest groups may use revolving door strategies to influence policymakers. This dissertation addresses these questions by investigating the propensity of EU interest groups to hire former public sector employees. The findings reveal several important dynamics. First, interest groups actively and strategically engage in revolving door practices, often recruiting lobbyists with short- or long-term experience in EU institutions, especially the EP. Second, the propensity to hire from the public sector varies by the type and resources of the interest group. For instance, wealthier organizations are more likely to hire employees with government experience. Third, the demand for process-oriented expertise, such as knowledge about lobbying politics, drives these hiring practices rather than the need for specialized policy knowledge. This expertise helps interest groups navigate the complexities of EU policymaking. Furthermore, highly professionalized organizations that are staff-driven benefit more from revolving door practices, gaining frequent access to EU institutions. In contrast, membership-driven organizations, where members have greater influence over advocacy strategies, benefit less from such practices. Finally, the revolving door's positive effect on access to policymakers diminishes in highly mobilized policy areas, suggesting that context matters. Overall, the study concludes that revolving door practices in the EU are primarily motivated by the logic of influence. Organizations that are highly professionalized gain the most from this strategy, while those driven by member interests benefit less. |
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Language
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English
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Publication
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Antwerp
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University of Antwerp, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science
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2024
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DOI
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10.63028/10067/2089250151162165141
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Volume/pages
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234 p.
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Note
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Beyers, Jan [Supervisor]
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Bursens, Peter [Supervisor]
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Full text (open access)
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