Publication
Title
Exploring the definition of non-monotonicity : logical and psychological considerations
Author
Abstract
When humans reason, they are able to revise their beliefs in light of new information and abandon obsolete conclusions. Logicians argued, that in some cases, such reasonings appear to be non-monotonic. Thus, many different, seemingly non-monotonic systems were created to formally model such cases. The purpose of this article is to re-examine the definition of non-monotonicity and its implementation in non-monotonic logics and in examples of everyday human reasoning. We will argue that many non-monotonic logics employ some weakened versions of the definitions of non-monotonicity, since in-between different steps of reasoning they either: a) allow previously accepted premises to be removed, or b) change the rules of inference. Of the two strategies, the second one seems downright absurd, since changing the rules of a given logic is a mere replacement of that logic with the rules of another. As a consequence we obtain two logics, whereas the definition of a non-monotonic logic is supposed to define one. The definition of non-monotonicity does not permit either of these cases, which means that such logics are monotonic.
Language
English
Source (journal)
University of Lodz. Department of Logic. Bulletin of the Section of Logic / Uniwersytet Lodzki. - Lodz, 1972, currens
Publication
Lodz : WydawnictwoUniwersytetu Lodzkiego , 2024
ISSN
0138-0680
DOI
10.18778/0138-0680.2024.14
Volume/pages
53 :4 (2024) , p. 419-453
ISI
001333167900001
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
Full text (open access)
UAntwerpen
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Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
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Record
Identifier c:irua:208936
Creation 08.10.2024
Last edited 26.02.2025
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