Publication
Title
European antidumping policy and firms' strategic choice of quality
Author
Abstract
In this paper, we consider a European industry characterized by vertical product differentiation. Using a two-stage model with quality choice made before price competition takes place, we show that EU anti-dumping policy that takes the form of price-undertakings offers a powerful protection to domestic firms, but only at the price competition stage. Once the impact of the A-D policy on quality choices is taken into account, EuropeanWelfare as well as profits accruing to the domestic firm decrease whenever the free trade equilibrium is affected. Hence we show that European Antidumping policies may induce perverse leapfrogging.
Language
English
Source (series)
Research paper / UFSIA, Faculty of Applied Economics , 1999:007
Publication
Antwerp : 1999
Volume/pages
19 p.
Full text (open access)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Record
Identifier
Creation 08.10.2008
Last edited 07.10.2022
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