Publication
Title
R&D and production behavior of asymmetric duopoly subject to knowledge spillovers
Author
Abstract
We construct an asymmetric duopolistic R&D and production behavior model subject to knowledge spillovers. This model is an extension to the symmetric model of dAspremont and Jacquemin (A&J (1988)) and aims to determine the cooperative and non-cooperative R&D strategies for two agents of different size. The paper concludes that the introduction of asymmetry into the A&J (1988) model leads to different R&D expenditures and production decisions made by the firms. Simulations show that the bigger agent has larger R&D expenditures and higher output. If firms choose the monopoly collusion or the welfaremaximizing strategy, the optimal solution implies that R&D is conducted asymmetrically by both agents, but that production is conducted only by the largest agent.
Language
English
Source (series)
Research paper / UFSIA, Faculty of Applied Economics ; 2000:5
Publication
Antwerpen : UFSIA, 2000
Volume/pages
42 p.
Full text (open access)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Record
Identification
Creation 08.10.2008
Last edited 04.09.2013
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