Publication
Title
University competition: symmetric or asymmetric quality choices
Author
Abstract
In this paper we model competition between two publicly …nanced and identical universities deciding on quality and on admission standards. The education o¤ered by the two universities is di¤erentiated horizontally and vertically. If horizontal di¤erentiation dominates, the Nash equilibrium is symmetric, and the two universities o¤er the same quality levels. If vertical di¤erentiation dominates, the Nash equilibrium is asymmetric, and the high quality university attracts the better students. Symmetric and asymmetric equilibria may also coexist. We highlight the importance of three driving forces behind these results: a single crossing condition, the peer group e¤ect, and the students’mobility costs. We also compare the monopoly and the duopoly case. The model we use is an extension of Del Rey’s [8] model.
Language
English
Source (series)
Working paper / University of Antwerp ; 2005:21
Publication
Antwerp : UA, 2005
Volume/pages
43 p.
Full text (open access)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Record
Identification
Creation 08.10.2008
Last edited 23.12.2015
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