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Title
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Bertrand colludes more than Cournot
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Author
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Abstract
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| On the basis of evidence of past oligopoly experiments, we argue that there is often significantly more tacit collusion in Bertrand price-choice than in Cournot quantity-choice markets. |
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Language
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English
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Source (series)
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Research paper / UA, Faculty of Applied Economics ; 2005:37
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Publication
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Antwerpen
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UA
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2005
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Volume/pages
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7 p.
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Full text (open access)
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