Title
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Opt in versus opt out: a free-entry analysis of privacy policies
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Author
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Abstract
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There is much debate on how the ow of information between
rms should be organized, and whether existing privacy laws should be amended. We o¤er a welfare comparison of the three main current policies towards consumer privacy anonymity, opt in, and opt out within a two-period model of localized competition. We show that when consumers
nd it too costly to opt in or opt out such that the default is the policy that rules, privacy policies shape
rmsability to collect and use customer information, and a¤ect their pricing strategy and entry decision di¤erently. The free-entry analysis reveals that social welfare is non-monotonic in the degree of privacy protection. Opt out is the socially preferred privacy policy while opt in socially underperforms anonymity. Consumers never opt out and choose to opt in only when its cost is su¢ ciently low. Only when opting in is cost-free do the opt-in and opt-out privacy policies coincide. |
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Language
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English
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Source (series)
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Research paper / UA, Faculty of Applied Economics , 2007:25
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Publication
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Antwerp
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UA
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2007
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Volume/pages
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27 p.
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Full text (open access)
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