Publication
Title
Phenomenal consciousness lite: no thanks!
Author
Abstract
The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Behavioral and brain sciences. - Cambridge, 1978, currens
Publication
Cambridge : 2007
ISSN
0140-525X [print]
1469-1825 [online]
Volume/pages
30:5/6(2007), p. 520-521
ISI
000259060900044
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 08.10.2008
Last edited 11.09.2017
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