Title
Earnings management and audit quality in Europe: evidence from the private client segment market Earnings management and audit quality in Europe: evidence from the private client segment market
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Applied Economics
Publication type
article
Publication
London ,
Subject
Economics
Source (journal)
European accounting review. - London
Volume/pages
17(2008) :3 , p. 447-469
ISSN
0963-8180
ISI
000258774900002
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Affiliation
University of Antwerp
Abstract
This paper contributes to the recent literature on financial reporting quality in private (i.e. non-listed) companies (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Burgstahler et al., 2006) by examining whether in these types of companies Big 4 audit firms, as high quality auditors, provide a constraint on earnings management. Considering incentives of auditors to supply a high audit quality in private firms, we expect that Big 4 auditors have an incentive to constrain earnings management only in high tax alignment countries, where financial statements are more scrutinized by tax authorities and the probability that an audit failure is detected is higher. Using data on private firms in European countries, this study provides evidence consistent with this expectation.
E-info
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