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Title
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A game-theoretical approach for reciprocal security-related prevention investment decisions
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Author
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Abstract
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| Every company situated within a chemical cluster faces important security risks from neighbouring companies. Investing in reciprocal security preventive measures is therefore necessary to avoid major accidents. These investments do not, however, provide a direct return on investment for the investor-company and thus plants are hesitative to invest. Moreover, there is likelihood that even if a company has fully invested in reciprocal security prevention, its neighbour has not, and as a result the company can experience a major accident caused by an initial (minor or major) accident which occurred in an adjacent chemical enterprise. In this article we employ a game-theoretic approach to interpret and model behaviour of two neighbouring chemical plants while negotiating and deciding on reciprocal security prevention investments. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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Reliability engineering and system safety. - Barking
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Publication
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Barking
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2010
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ISSN
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0951-8320
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DOI
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10.1016/J.RESS.2009.07.001
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Volume/pages
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95
:1
(2010)
, p. 1-9
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ISI
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000271605000001
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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