Title
A game-theoretical approach for reciprocal security-related prevention investment decisions A game-theoretical approach for reciprocal security-related prevention investment decisions
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Applied Economics
Publication type
article
Publication
Barking ,
Subject
Economics
Engineering sciences. Technology
Source (journal)
Reliability engineering and system safety. - Barking
Volume/pages
95(2010) :1 , p. 1-9
ISSN
0951-8320
ISI
000271605000001
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Affiliation
University of Antwerp
Abstract
Every company situated within a chemical cluster faces important security risks from neighbouring companies. Investing in reciprocal security preventive measures is therefore necessary to avoid major accidents. These investments do not, however, provide a direct return on investment for the investor-company and thus plants are hesitative to invest. Moreover, there is likelihood that even if a company has fully invested in reciprocal security prevention, its neighbour has not, and as a result the company can experience a major accident caused by an initial (minor or major) accident which occurred in an adjacent chemical enterprise. In this article we employ a game-theoretic approach to interpret and model behaviour of two neighbouring chemical plants while negotiating and deciding on reciprocal security prevention investments.
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