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Title
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A note on strategic delegation: the market share case
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Author
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Abstract
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| We consider a two-stage market share delegation game with two competing firms. Each owner delegates the production decision to a manager. Each manager's remuneration is a weighted sum of profits and market share. The market share delegation game results in higher duopoly profits than the sales delegation game. Both output delegation models lead to more aggressive managerial behavior than the standard Cournot case, implying lower profitability and higher social welfare: similar results are obtained for the Bertrand version of the delegation model. Market share delegation is the dominant strategy in a game in which owners can choose not to hire a manager or, if they do so, to pay their manager a bonus based on profits and sales or market share. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam, 1983, currens
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Publication
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Amsterdam
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North Holland
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2007
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ISSN
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0167-7187
[print]
1873-7986
[online]
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DOI
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10.1016/J.IJINDORG.2006.04.017
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Volume/pages
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25
:3
(2007)
, p. 531-539
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ISI
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000246231900006
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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