Publication
Title
Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: an experimental analysis
Author
Abstract
We experimentally test Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) theory of sequential reciprocity in a sequential prisoner's dilemma and a mini-ultimatum game. Data on behavior and first- and second-order beliefs allow us to classify each subject's behavior as a material best response, a reciprocity best response, both, or none. We found that in both games the behavior of about 80% of the first movers was a material best response, a reciprocity best response, or both. The remaining 20% of first movers almost always made choices that were too kind according to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's theory. Second-mover behavior, in both games, was in line with the predictions of the theory. We found first- and second-order beliefs to be unbiased in the sequential prisoner's dilemma, but biased in the mini-ultimatum game.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Games and economic behavior. - Duluth, Minn.
Publication
Duluth, Minn. : 2010
ISSN
0899-8256
Volume/pages
70:2(2010), p. 289-303
ISI
000284394500006
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 22.11.2010
Last edited 21.06.2017
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