Title
Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: an experimental analysis Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: an experimental analysis
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Applied Economics
Publication type
article
Publication
Duluth, Minn. ,
Subject
Economics
Source (journal)
Games and economic behavior. - Duluth, Minn.
Volume/pages
70(2010) :2 , p. 289-303
ISSN
0899-8256
ISI
000284394500006
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Affiliation
University of Antwerp
Abstract
We experimentally test Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) theory of sequential reciprocity in a sequential prisoner's dilemma and a mini-ultimatum game. Data on behavior and first- and second-order beliefs allow us to classify each subject's behavior as a material best response, a reciprocity best response, both, or none. We found that in both games the behavior of about 80% of the first movers was a material best response, a reciprocity best response, or both. The remaining 20% of first movers almost always made choices that were too kind according to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's theory. Second-mover behavior, in both games, was in line with the predictions of the theory. We found first- and second-order beliefs to be unbiased in the sequential prisoner's dilemma, but biased in the mini-ultimatum game.
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