|
Title
|
|
|
|
Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: an experimental analysis
| |
|
Author
|
|
|
|
| |
|
Abstract
|
|
|
|
| We experimentally test Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) theory of sequential reciprocity in a sequential prisoner's dilemma and a mini-ultimatum game. Data on behavior and first- and second-order beliefs allow us to classify each subject's behavior as a material best response, a reciprocity best response, both, or none. We found that in both games the behavior of about 80% of the first movers was a material best response, a reciprocity best response, or both. The remaining 20% of first movers almost always made choices that were too kind according to Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's theory. Second-mover behavior, in both games, was in line with the predictions of the theory. We found first- and second-order beliefs to be unbiased in the sequential prisoner's dilemma, but biased in the mini-ultimatum game. |
| |
|
Language
|
|
|
|
English
| |
|
Source (journal)
|
|
|
|
Games and economic behavior. - Duluth, Minn.
| |
|
Publication
|
|
|
|
Duluth, Minn.
:
2010
| |
|
ISSN
|
|
|
|
0899-8256
| |
|
DOI
|
|
|
|
10.1016/J.GEB.2010.02.009
| |
|
Volume/pages
|
|
|
|
70
:2
(2010)
, p. 289-303
| |
|
ISI
|
|
|
|
000284394500006
| |
|
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
|
|
|
|
| |
|