Publication
Title
World Trade Organization judicialization and preference convergence in EU trade policy : making the agent's life easier
Author
Abstract
Some feared that judicialization in the World Trade Organization (WTO) would decrease WTO members' propensity to support multilateral trade liberalization. Yet, in 2001 WTO members launched a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, fervently supported by the European Union (EU) despite the influence of domestic protectionist forces. This contribution offers an explanation of why judicialization elicited increased convergence of policy preferences between a liberalizing agent (Commission) and multiple principals (economic interests). I identify three judicialization-led rationales for this: the empowerment of exporters relative to protectionist forces; the enhanced attractiveness of the WTO as an institutional location for international regulatory standards; and the strengthening of incentives to engage positively in negotiations to offset the likely costs of adverse panel rulings. I show the plausibility of this argument through an empirical analysis of EU politics in three negotiation areas in the Doha Round: services; agriculture; and the 'Singapore issues'.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Journal of European public policy. - London
Publication
London : 2011
ISSN
1350-1763
Volume/pages
18:3(2011), p. 361-382
ISI
000289504900003
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Law 
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 05.07.2011
Last edited 20.09.2017
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