|
Title
|
|
|
|
Do we see apples as edible?
| |
|
Author
|
|
|
|
| |
|
Abstract
|
|
|
|
| Do we (sometimes) perceive apples as edible? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we see it as having certain shape, size and color and we only infer on the basis of these properties that it is. I argue that we do indeed see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I point out that Susanna Siegel's influential argument in favor of the claim that we represent sortal properties perceptually does not work. Second, I argue that we can fix this argument if we replace the sortal property in question with the property of being edible, climbable or Q-able in general. |
| |
|
Language
|
|
|
|
English
| |
|
Source (journal)
|
|
|
|
Pacific philosophical quarterly
| |
|
Publication
|
|
|
|
2011
| |
|
DOI
|
|
|
|
10.1111/J.1468-0114.2011.01398.X
| |
|
Volume/pages
|
|
|
|
92
:3
(2011)
, p. 305-322
| |
|
ISI
|
|
|
|
000293563100002
| |
|
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
|
|
|
|
| |
|