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Title
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Imaginative resistance and conversational implicature
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Author
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Abstract
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| We experience resistance when we are engaging with fictional works which present certain (for example, morally objectionable) claims. But in virtue of what properties do sentences trigger this imaginative resistance? I argue that while most accounts of imaginative resistance have looked for semantic properties in virtue of which sentences trigger it, this is unlikely to give us a coherent account, because imaginative resistance is a pragmatic phenomenon. It works in a way very similar to Paul Grice's widely analysed conversational implicature. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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The philosophical quarterly. - London, 1950, currens
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Publication
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London
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2010
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ISSN
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0031-8094
[print]
1467-9213
[online]
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DOI
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10.1111/J.1467-9213.2009.625.X
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Volume/pages
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60
:240
(2010)
, p. 586-600
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ISI
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000279534900008
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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