|
Title
|
|
|
|
Imagining, recognizing and discriminating : reconsidering the ability hypothesis
|
|
|
Author
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Abstract
|
|
|
|
| According to the Ability Hypothesis, knowing what it is like to have experience E is just having the ability to imagine or recognize or remember having experience E. I examine various versions of the Ability Hypothesis and point out that they all face serious objections. Then I propose a new version that is not vulnerable to these objections: knowing what it is like to experience E is having the ability to discriminate imagining or having experience E from imagining or having any other experience. I argue that if we replace the ability to imagine or recognize with the ability to discriminate, the Ability Hypothesis can be salvaged. |
|
|
|
Language
|
|
|
|
English
|
|
|
Source (journal)
|
|
|
|
Philosophy and phenomenological research. - Providence, R.I.
|
|
|
Publication
|
|
|
|
Providence, R.I.
:
2009
|
|
|
ISSN
|
|
|
|
0031-8205
|
|
|
DOI
|
|
|
|
10.1111/J.1933-1592.2009.00299.X
|
|
|
Volume/pages
|
|
|
|
79
:3
(2009)
, p. 699-717
|
|
|
ISI
|
|
|
|
000271811100009
|
|
|
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
|
|
|
|
|
|