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Title
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The properties of singular causation
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Author
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Abstract
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| Theories of singular causation have a genuine problem with properties. In virtue of what property do events (or facts) cause other events? One possible answer to this question, Davidson's, is | that causal relations hold between particulars and properties play no role in the way a particular causes another. According to another, recently fashionable answer, in contrast, events cause other events in virtue of having a trope (as opposed to a property- j type). Both views face serious objections. My aim in this paper is to combine these two very different solutions to the problem of i the properties of singular causation and to argue that this combined view can avoid objections against both of them. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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The monist : an international quarterly journal of general philosophical inquiry. - Chicago, Ill., 1888, currens
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Publication
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Chicago, Ill.
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The Open Court Publishing Co
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2009
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ISSN
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0026-9662
[print]
2153-3601
[online]
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Volume/pages
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92
:1
(2009)
, p. 112-132
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Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
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