Publication
Title
Responsibility sensitive egalitarianism and optimal linear income taxation
Author
Abstract
We compute optimal linear taxes on labor income with quasilinear preferences between income and labor. Agents differ in their productivity and in their taste for leisure. A responsibility sensitive egalitarian wants to compensate for the former differences but not for the latter. This intuition is captured by a social planner that wants to equalize opportunities for subjective utility along the lines of the criteria proposed by Roemer and Van de gaer, and by a social planner evaluating social states based on an advantage function representing reference preferences. Our theoretical results are illustrated with empirical data for Belgium.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam
Publication
Amsterdam : 2004
ISSN
0165-4896
Volume/pages
48:2(2004), p. 151-182
ISI
000222836300004
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
[E?say:metaLocaldata.cgzprojectinf]
Publication type
Subject
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 01.03.2012
Last edited 18.09.2017