Title
Responsibility sensitive egalitarianism and optimal linear income taxation Responsibility sensitive egalitarianism and optimal linear income taxation
Author
Faculty/Department
Faculty of Applied Economics
Faculty of Social Sciences. Sociology
Publication type
article
Publication
Amsterdam ,
Subject
Politics
Source (journal)
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam
Volume/pages
48(2004) :2 , p. 151-182
ISSN
0165-4896
ISI
000222836300004
Carrier
E
Target language
English (eng)
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Abstract
We compute optimal linear taxes on labor income with quasilinear preferences between income and labor. Agents differ in their productivity and in their taste for leisure. A responsibility sensitive egalitarian wants to compensate for the former differences but not for the latter. This intuition is captured by a social planner that wants to equalize opportunities for subjective utility along the lines of the criteria proposed by Roemer and Van de gaer, and by a social planner evaluating social states based on an advantage function representing reference preferences. Our theoretical results are illustrated with empirical data for Belgium.
E-info
http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000222836300004&DestLinkType=RelatedRecords&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=ef845e08c439e550330acc77c7d2d848
http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000222836300004&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=ef845e08c439e550330acc77c7d2d848
http://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=PARTNER_APP&SrcAuth=LinksAMR&KeyUT=WOS:000222836300004&DestLinkType=CitingArticles&DestApp=ALL_WOS&UsrCustomerID=ef845e08c439e550330acc77c7d2d848