Publication
Title
A modified Cournot model of the natural gas market in the European Union : mixed-motives delegation in a politicized environment
Author
Abstract
With Gazprom gaining prominence as the major supplier of natural gas in the European Union, the European gas market becomes more politicized. We assume that Gazprom's interest as a state monopolist is not only to maximize profit, but also to seek market power, presumably because this contributes to the geopolitical power of Russia at large. We introduce a modeling tool, so-called strategic delegation games, to analyze the implications of Gazprom's operation in the EU. By way of illustration, we model the case where Gazprom competes against two profit-maximizing rivals: Algerian Sonatrach and Norwegian Statoil. We prove that if Gazprom serves any of a comprehensive type of nonprofit objectives, the outcome is beneficial for the EU's consumers, as Gazprom's behavior shifts volumes up and brings prices down. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Language
English
Source (journal)
Energy policy. - Guildford, 1973, currens
Publication
Guildford : 2012
ISSN
0301-4215 [print]
1873-6777 [online]
Volume/pages
41(2012), p. 280-285
ISI
000301155500029
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
Full text (publisher's version - intranet only)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 14.05.2012
Last edited 08.10.2017
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