Publication
Title
Media revenue sharing as a coordination device in sports leagues
Author
Abstract
Because sports clubs jointly produce sports competitions, the quality of these competitions is determined by the talent investments of all clubs involved in them. Operating as legal cartels, sports leagues may try to coordinate talent investments in order to maximize profitability. In this paper I analyze the ways in which sharing mechanisms for collective media revenues may serve this goal when demand comes from differentiated consumers. Performance-based sharing turns out to be an inefficient sharing mechanism for the league. Such inefficient cartel behavior may be rationalized as the result of bargaining with asymmetric outside options. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Language
English
Source (journal)
International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam
Publication
Amsterdam : 2012
ISSN
0167-7187
Volume/pages
30:2(2012), p. 153-163
ISI
000302515200003
Full text (Publishers DOI)
Full text (publishers version - intranet only)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 05.06.2012
Last edited 07.03.2017
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