| Title |
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Perceiving tropes
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| Author |
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| Abstract |
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| There are two very different ways of thinking about perception. According to the first one, perception is representational: it represents the world as being a certain way. According to the second, perception is a genuine relation between the perceiver and a token object. These two views are thought to be incompatible. My aim is to work out the least problematic version of the representational view of perception that preserves the most important considerations in favor of the relational view. According to this version of representationalism, the properties represented in perception are tropes-abstract particulars that are logically incapable of being present in two distinct individuals at the same time. I call this view 'trope representationalism'. | |
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| Language |
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English
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| Source (journal) |
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Erkenntnis: an international journal of analytical philosophy. - Dordrecht |
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| Publication |
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Dordrecht : 2012
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| ISSN |
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0165-0106
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| Volume/pages |
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77:1(2012), p. 1-14
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| ISI |
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000304697300001
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