Publication
Title
Localized competition, multimarket operation, and collusive behavior
Author
Abstract
This paper studies collusive behavior in a repeated oligopoly with localized competition. Private information about the rivals' past actions naturally arises from this market structure. The resulting communication problems imply that firms should adopt strategies with sufficiently lenient punishments. Infinite grim punishments are too severe for large discount factors. The standard stick-and-carrot punishments from the perfect public information model are too severe for all discount factors. Modified stick-and-carrot punishments can be used, although for a smaller range of discount factors than the standard stick-and-carrot punishments under public information.
Language
English
Source (journal)
International economic review. - Philadelphia, Pa
Publication
Philadelphia, Pa : 1998
ISSN
0020-6598
Volume/pages
39:2(1998), p. 371-398
ISI
000073493600007
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
UAntwerpen
Publication type
Subject
External links
Web of Science
Record
Identification
Creation 12.07.2012
Last edited 17.07.2017