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Title
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District magnitude and home styles of representation in European democracies
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Author
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Abstract
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| How political representatives interact with constituents is contingent on the conditions under which they compete for re-election. It has been the assumption that intra-party competition shapes legislators' incentive to cultivate a personal reputation and thereby the incentive to engage in any constituency-oriented action that reputation may be built on. Using data from the PARTIREP cross-national survey among regional and national legislators in 12 European democracies, the assumption is proven to be inaccurate: focusing on more than one action at a time, it becomes clear that district magnitude increases the time representatives spend on some constituency-oriented actions and decreases the time they spend on others (even when the electoral incentive to nurture a personal reputation is strong). The article demonstrates that representatives' choice to engage in four constituency-oriented actions is related to the nature of these home styles and their electoral utility in a given context. |
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Language
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English
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Source (journal)
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West European politics. - London, 1978, currens
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Publication
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London
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2013
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ISSN
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0140-2382
[print]
1743-9655
[online]
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DOI
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10.1080/01402382.2013.796183
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Volume/pages
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36
:5
(2013)
, p. 986-1006
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ISI
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000322755300006
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Full text (Publisher's DOI)
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Full text (open access)
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