Publication
Title
Convexity of the triple helix of innovation game
Author
Abstract
Purpose This paper aims to determine the conditions for the core of the Triple Helix game to exist. The Triple Helix of university-industry-government relationships is a three-person cooperative game with transferable utility. Then, the core, the Shapley value and the nucleolus were used as indicators of the synergy within an innovation system. Whereas the Shapley value and the nucleolus always exist, the core may not. Design/methodology/approach The core of a three-person cooperative game with transferable utility exists only if and only if the game is convex. The paper applies the convexity condition to the Triple Helix game. Findings The Triple Helix game is convex if and only if there is output within the system; it is strictly convex if and only if all the three bilateral and the trilateral relationships have an output. Practical implications Convex games are competitive situations in which there are strong incentives towards the formation of large coalitions; therefore, innovation actors must cooperate to maximise their interests. Furthermore, a Triple Helix game may be split into subgames for comprehensive analyses and several Triple Helix games may be combined for a global study. Originality/value This paper extends the meaning of the Shapley value and the nucleolus for Triple Helix innovation actors: the Shapley value indicates the quantity a player wins because of the coalitions he involves in and the nucleolus the return for solidarity of an innovation actor.
Language
English
Source (journal)
International Journal of Innovation Science
Publication
2024
ISSN
1757-2223
DOI
10.1108/IJIS-03-2023-0071
Volume/pages
(2024)
ISI
001146875200001
Full text (Publisher's DOI)
Full text (open access)
UAntwerpen
Faculty/Department
Research group
Publication type
Subject
Affiliation
Publications with a UAntwerp address
External links
Record
Identifier
Creation 22.01.2024
Last edited 01.02.2024
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